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Section 102 of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act: "Preserving"
State Sovereignty
Joseph A. Wilson
The Uruguay round of negotiations was a comprehensive ef-
fort to reform the international trade system.1 To a large extent,
these efforts were successful. Among the innovative provisions
of the Uruguay Round were agreements on both Trade in Serv-
ices and Intellectual Property.2 More importantly, these agree-
ments were accompanied by the creation of a new governing
body.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) was created to over-
see the implementation of the trade agreements and settle dis-
putes among member nations. 3 To that end, the decisions of the
WTO dispute settlement body are binding on all members; an
adverse decision becomes an international obligation of the de-
fendant nation.4 The WTO has consequently been welcomed as
a much needed reform to the international trade system. 5
1. Concluded on December 15, 1993, after seven years of negotiation, the
Uruguay Round Agreements fundamentally restructured and improved the
trading system which had developed under GATT. William J. Aceves, Lost Sov-
ereignty? The Implications of the Uruguay Round Agreements, 19 FoRDHAM
INT'L L.J. 427, 427 (1995). See also Judith E. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, The Uru-
guay Round: Where We Are, reprinted in URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS:
WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE? (1991).
2. Aceves, supra note 1, at 428.
3. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 33
I.L.M 112 (1994) [hereinafter Understanding]. The Understanding applies to
all disputes which are formally referred to resolution under GATr. Id. art. 1.
The Understanding contemplates that resort to formal procedures will not be
commonplace. The preferred dispute settlement process first consists of at-
tempts at a negotiated settlement-a mutually agreed solution. If that fails,
the injured member may utilize the mediation services offered by GATT, and
finally, may resort to the formal panel process. Id. art. 3, 7. See also JOHN H.
JACKSON, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIc RELATIONS (3d ed. 1995).
4. Aceves, supra note 1, at 462. See also Samuel C. Straight, GATT and
NAFTA: Marrying Effective Dispute Settlement and the Sovereignty of the Fifty
States, 45 DuKE L.J. 216, 219-20 (1995).
5. Straight, supra note 4, at 223.
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Under the former system, the decisions of dispute settle-
ment panels were not binding until adopted by the consensus of
all Contracting Parties. 6 Consequently, any Contracting Party
that was unhappy with an adverse decision could block adoption
of the decision by casting a lone dissenting vote.7 Any subse-
quent retaliation by the complaining party would be GATT
illegal.
Under the reformed system, however, a member nation may
no longer avoid an adverse decision by dissenting." As a result,
the new system not only makes the enforcement of decisions eas-
ier, it encourages member nations to solve trade disputes
quickly and amicably.
However welcome these reforms were among the trade
negotiators, the creation of the WTO caused serious concerns
among United States lawmakers. Concerned that the new dis-
pute settlement process would leave state and local regulations
susceptible to attack by both foreign and domestic parties, state
officials sought protection for their regulations. 9
After an extensive lobbying effort involving the Attorneys
General of forty-two states, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
(URAA) was enacted with protection for state regulations. 10 Sec-
tion 102 of the Act was ostensibly intended to protect state regu-
lations against attack from foreign and domestic private parties,
while simultaneously limiting government challenges. 1'
6. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 97 (1989).
7. Id.
8. G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory:
An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DuKE L.J. 829, 839-42 (1995).
9. These state officials confirmed the suspicions raised in the article To
Compel or Encourage: Seeking Compliance with International Trade Agree-
ments at the State Level. Kenneth J. Cooper, To Compel or Encourage: Seeking
Compliance with International Trade Agreements at the State Level, 2 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 143, 147 (1993) (noting that federal intervention may be seen as
an infringement on local official's authority to set and maintain policies).
10. An implementing act is the federal legislation by which an interna-
tional agreement becomes part of federal law. For a discussion of the relation-
ship between international agreements, federal law and state and local laws,
see infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. See also Robert E. Hudec, The
Legal Status of GATT in the Domestic Law of the United States, in 4 STUDIES IN
TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAw 187, 192 (noting that GATT is superior to state
laws, but not superior to inconsistent federal law).
For a discussion of the lobbying effort, see infra notes 79 & 85.
11. The URAA was the implementing legislation for the Uruguay Round
Agreements in which the WTO Agreement and its provisions (GATT, GATS,
TRIPS, etc.) are codified as federal law. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19
U.S.C. § 3501 (1994). Within this Note, primary reference will be made to Sec-
tion 102, rather than its codification in the U.S.C. However, where appropriate,
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This Note examines the lasting effect of the protection pro-
vided in Section 102, particularly the likelihood of federal chal-
lenges to GATT-illegal state regulations. Part I of this Note will
detail the dispute settlement process both before and after crea-
tion of the WTO, as well as the difficulties the reformed process
creates for state regulations. Part II will outline and analyze
those provisions of the URAA that are intended to protect state
regulations. It is the goal of this Note to determine whether
state regulations can survive under the WTO's dispute settle-
ment process. This Note argues that state regulations are ex-
tremely vulnerable to international, as well as domestic,
political pressures-pressures that they may not withstand. Fi-
nally, this Note concludes that Section 102 provides little actual
protection to state policy makers and their laws.
I. Innovations in the Dispute Settlement Process
GATT has formed the backbone of international trade
agreements for nearly fifty years, a period during which the dis-
pute resolution process evolved slowly. 12 Originally, Article XX-
III governed conflicts between Contracting Parties. 13 However,
no structured institutional arrangement existed for deciding
conflicts, nor for enforcing such decisions. During the early
years of GATT, the contracting parties settled disputes jointly or
through the use of "working groups" of representatives. 14 Be-
ginning in the 1950's, the GATT Secretariat adopted a panel-
references to Section 102 will also include references to the codified version
under 19 U.S.C. § 3501 et seq.
12. For a brief history of the GATT dispute settlement process, see Shell,
supra note 8 (detailing the introduction of formal panel, outlining the dispute
settlement process through the Uruguay Rounds, and detailing the rise of legal-
ism in GATT proceedings).
13. GATT Article XXIII authorizes suspension of trade concessions or obli-
gations whenever a panel determines that a state has nullified or impaired ben-
efits under GATT. The substantive law-what constitutes a nullification or
impairment-is quite comprehensive. See generally JACKSON, supra note 3, at
327-71. GATT article XXIII(2) provides in part:
If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting par-
ties concerned within a reasonable time, ... the matter may be re-
ferred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The CONTRACTING
PARTIES shall promptly investigate any matter so referred to them
and shall make appropriate recommendations to the contracting par-
ties which they consider to be concerned, or give a ruling on the matter,
as appropriate.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5 & 6,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
14. These groups were the earliest version of a panel oriented process.
Shell, supra note 8, at 841.
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based process. 15 If informal negotiations failed to resolve a con-
flict, the dispute would be sent to a panel, which would consider
the evidence and issue a written decision or recommendation. 16
The Contracting Parties would then decide whether to adopt the
recommendation and impose sanctions. 17 If adopted, the deci-
sion would become an international obligation of the defend-
ant.18 In order to satisfy that obligation, the defendant nation
must either alter its domestic laws or accept trade sanctions. 19
However, adoption of the panel recommendation required a
consensus of contracting parties. 20 In the absence of a consen-
sus, the panel report would not become part of GATT law.2'
Consequently, a single adverse vote, including that of either
party to the dispute, would prevent adoption of the panel
recommendation. 22
GATT dispute settlement procedures changed dramatically
in 1994 after the organization of the WTO. 23 As part of its au-
thority to enforce trade policy, the WTO has the ability to bind
all parties to dispute settlement decisions and allow sanctions
against offending nations. 24 These decisions-as adjudged by
an independent WTO panel-are adopted automatically, unless
there is a consensus of members to the contrary. 25 Dissent will
15. Panels are composed of individuals acting in their own capacity, and
are not to be considered as representatives of their respective nations (a concept
which dramatically differs from the national representatives identified with the
working parties). Early panels consisted of willing representatives. In recent
years, though, the trend has been to use individuals that are not associated
with GATT-professors and government officials. It should be noted that there
was no explicit right to have a panel hear a controversy until 1989. JACKSON,
supra note 3, at 339-41.
16. Shell, supra note 8, at 842.
17. JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 175-76 (1969).
18. Id.
19. If the defendant nation does not reach a satisfactory result (i.e. change
the offending laws), the complainant may withdraw previous concessions under
GATT article XXIII:2. In other words, the complainant is allowed to retaliate.
20. JACKSON, supra note 6, at 50. See also ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE 1980's 8 (1993).
21. See Straight, supra note 4, at 223.
22. JACKSON, supra note 6, at 50.
23. See supra note 1.
24. Aceves, supra note 1, at 437-39.
25. The WTO's conflict resolution and enforcement authority is outlined in
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes. The Understanding provides that, with regard to settling disputes
among members,
[w]ithin 60 days after the date of circulation of a panel report to the
Members, the report shall be adopted at a [Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB)] meeting unless a party to the dispute formally notifies the DSB
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no longer allow a defendant nation to avoid the international ob-
ligation requiring them to correct the offending behavior or
law. 2
6
One of the nations most affected by the new dispute settle-
ment process is the United States. Because of the federal struc-
ture of the United States, regulation occurs on several levels-
federal, state, and local.27 WTO members can challenge the reg-
ulations on any of these levels, and a WTO panel can find any of
these regulations GATT illegal.28 Upon adoption, the panel de-
cision becomes a binding international obligation of the United
States. 29 In order to satisfy that obligation, the United States
of its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt
the report.
Understanding, supra note 3, art. 16, 4 (emphasis added). Automatic adop-
tion, unless there exists a consensus to the contrary, also applies to Appellate
Panel decisions. Id. art. 17, 14.
Furthermore, the WTO introduces several significant dispute settlement
procedures. First, the Understanding sets up a bi-level decision making pro-
cess. On the lowest level, independent Dispute Settlement Body (hereinafter
DSB) Panels are set up to hear individual conflicts. These panels are basically
the same panels utilized before the WTO, although there are organizational
changes. Panel decisions are issued to the Dispute Settlement Body-com-
posed of all Members-which automatically adopts the reports, subject to two
exceptions. First, the DSB will not adopt the report if there is a consensus
against adoption. Second, automatic adoption will be postponed if either party
elects to appeal the panel decision. See JACKSON, supra note 3, at 342-43.
The creation of a permanent appellate body is also a new innovation in
GATT dispute settlements. Shell, supra note 8, at 849. It is composed of seven
individuals of "recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, inter-
national trade and the subject matter of the covered agreements generally."
Furthermore, there is no set membership-neither the European Community
(EC) nor the United States is guaranteed representation on the appellate panel.
The decision of the appellate panel will be automatically adopted, unless there
is a consensus to the contrary. Understanding, supra note 3, art. 17, 14. See
also supra notes 3, 13 & 15.
26. Aceves, supra note 1, at 429.
27. See infra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
28. Article XXIII allows a nation which is injured (i.e. a loss of competitive-
ness under the Agreement) by the actions of another state to seek redress. Fur-
thermore, the offending nation is responsible for the restrictive measures
imposed by its governmental or territorial subunits. In the case of the United
States, GATT applies not only to the federal government, but to the states and
local governments as well. GATT, supra note 13, ad art. III, % 1. International
Agreements, enacted as part of federal law, effectively bind state laws. Courts
will allow government challenges to invalidate state laws that are inconsistent
with international obligations. Hudec, supra note 10, at 192. See also John H.
Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domes-
tic Law, 66 MICH. L. REv. 249 (1967).
29. Straight, supra note 4, at 219.
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government must either change the offending statute or accept
retaliation.30
The threat of punishment following the automatic adoption
of an adverse decision may have serious consequences for state
regulations. According to the U.S. Constitution, state regulators
cannot negotiate with foreign governments or organizations, in-
cluding the WTO. 31 In essence, state lawmakers depend upon
the federal government to protect their regulations in the face of
conflicting international obligations.3 2 Under the pre-WTO dis-
pute settlement process, the federal government could protect
state regulations by providing the single dissenting vote,
preventing the consensus required to adopt an adverse decision
and avoiding an international obligation. 33 Under the current
WTO process, however, the United States can no longer prevent
the adoption of decisions that deem state regulations GATT-
illegal.
The threat of automatic adoption, and subsequent retalia-
tion, may provide an incentive for the national government to
invalidate state laws (either before or after a challenge). 34 In-
deed, state laws appear particularly susceptible due to the vari-
ety of ways in which the national government may invalidate
them.
II. State Laws and Dispute Settlement
A. THE EFFECT OF STATE REGULATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL
TRADE
The U.S. Constitution prohibits individual states from in-
terfering with foreign commerce and exacting customs duties.35
30. Understanding, supra note 3, art. 22. A WTO DSB panel does not auto-
matically affect U.S. domestic law. Rather, the United States can pursue one of
three options. First, the United States could negotiate a satisfactory solution
with the complainant. Second, the United States could compensate the com-
plainant with additional concessions. Finally, it could refuse to act, and simply
accept sanctions (the withdrawal of concessions by the complainant). Rufus
Yerxa, Deputy United States Trade Representative, prepared testimony to the
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 14, 1994, FEDERAL NEWS SER-
VICE WASHINGTON PACKAGE, available in 1994 WL 8371590.
31. JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND: NATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RULES 142-43 (1984).
32. Straight, supra note 4, at 219.
33. See supra note 20.
34. See infra notes 152-54.
35. Congress possesses power to regulate foreign commerce, as well as au-
thority to lay and collect duties and imposts. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1 & 3.
For a general discussion of these powers, and infringement upon them by state
406 [Vol. 6:401
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However, it does not necessarily follow that state regulations do
not affect international trade. Indeed, the exact opposite is true.
In an expanding global market, state regulations and revenue
measures increasingly affect international trade.36 Some of
these affects are deliberate, aimed at attracting favored indus-
tries or discouraging unwelcome investment. 37 A number of
states maintain industrial policies intended to stimulate manu-
facturing or reduce unemployment.38 As part of their policies,
many of these states offer tax incentives to foreign industries
relocating within their state.39
. Other regulations, though less deliberate, still impact trade.
State governments continue to exercise extensive powers in the
areas of land use, insurance and banking regulation, environ-
mental controls, hazardous waste disposal, labor relations, and
corporate regulation. 40 Numerous regulations cover a broad
range of topics-including health and safety guidelines,41 com-
mercial law, government procurement, and revenue measures.42
governments, see Brenda S. Beerman, State Involvement in the Promotion of
Export Trade: Is It Time to Rethink the Concept of Federalism as it Pertains to
Foreign Relations?, 21 N.C. J. INT'L & COM. REG. 187, 197 (1995) (arguing that
states are increasingly looking to global markets in order to raise revenues).
36. Beerman, supra note 35, at 198.
37. "Some state-enacted laws, such as the unitary taxation formula or a
prohibition on foreign investment in certain business or agricultural sectors,
have a clear and precise impact on the overseas business community." Earl H.
Fry, The United States of America, in FEDERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELA-
TIONS, THE ROLE OF SUBNATIONAL UNITS 292 (1990).
38. THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN FEDERALISM, COMPETITION AMONG GoVERN-
MENTs 149-53 (1990).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. States have traditionally maintained the authority to regulate health
and safety measures, recognized as the exercise of their individual police pow-
ers. However, the authority to exercise the police power is not explicitly recog-
nized in the U.S. Constitution. Rather, it has grown out of a large body of case
law. JOHN E. NOwAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 277 (4th ed. 1991).
42. See Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912) (state inspection laws are
within the state police power when reasonable). See also Trojan Technologies
Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903 (3d. Cir. 1990), cert. denied 59 U.S.L.W. 3527
(U.S. June 10, 1991) (No. 90-1189) (holding that federal law did not preempt
Pennsylvania's "Buy American" statute). State regulations on a variety of sub-
jects will be upheld against challenge. Under the Dormant Commerce Clause,
the standard for challenging state regulations, as a violation of the Commerce
Clause, is outlined in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.: "Where the state regulates
evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effect on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits." Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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Furthermore, many states impose sales and use taxes (as
well as income taxes) on goods and services sold within their
borders. 43 Although these taxes must be applied in an equitable
manner-neither discriminating against interstate commerce,
44 nor against foreign commerce45-they do affect the sale of im-
ported goods.
Finally, the States themselves have dabbled in interna-
tional relations on a number of occasions. Many states have
understandings, compacts, or contracts with foreign govern-
ments.46 Together these state regulations, incentives, agree-
ments, and taxes create a considerable burden on both domestic
and foreign commerce. 47 Yet they also protect a state's citizens
and raise considerable revenues. 48 Consequently, state officials
are rather protective of their ability to continue these activi-
ties.49 When the WTO appeared as a threat to the continued use
of these tools, state officials responded, opposing any measures
which could detract from their authority.50 These officials con-
sidered the WTO dispute settlement a particularly strong threat
given the status of state laws in international trade and their
susceptibility to attack.51
43. Most of the individual states, the District of Columbia, and certain mu-
nicipalities (for example New York City) impose income tax on residents and on
non residents engaged in business within their jurisdictions. And, several
states determine the taxable income of a multinational corporation within a
state by the unitary method, whereby worldwide sales are allocated to the state
based on the percentage of sales, payroll and property located within the state.
Finally, a sales or use tax, as well as business licensing fees may be imposed by
local authorities. 1990 INTERNATIONAL TAX HANDBOOK 93014, 93034 (1990).
44. See supra note 35.
45. See infra note 53.
46. Fry, supra note 37, at 290. It has been estimated that over 1,000 state
and local governments engage in activities which could be considered foreign
relations. Beerman, supra note 35, at 189.
47. Some economists argue that the complexities and trade barriers cre-
ated by fifty different regulatory schemes impedes trade and retards economic
growth. John Kincaid, Foreword: The New Federalism Context of the New Judi-
cial Federalism, 26 RUTGrs L.J. 913 (1995).
48. DYE, supra note 38, at 149-53.
49. See infra notes 78-80.
50. See infra notes 82 & 86.
51. See infra note 80.
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B. THE STATUS OF STATE REGULATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE: THE STATES' PREDICAMENT
International agreements can become part of federal law
through either legislation or executive agreement.5 2 Once inte-
grated into federal law, they become superior to state law (as are
all federal laws). 53 Consequently, the terms of GATT, once codi-
fied in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act are enforceable
under federal law. State laws must thereafter be consistent
with the URAA (and thus must comply with GATT). After codi-
fication, GATT illegal state laws can be challenged under the
Supremacy Clause as conflicting with federal law.54
Furthermore, since state regulations are included in the
body of United States law, they are subject to challenge by for-
eign nations under the GATT and the WTO.55 Indeed, previous
panel reports have found state regulations inconsistent with
GATT.5 6
However, a difficult problem arises when a WTO panel
deems a state regulation GATT-illegal. Although the panel deci-
sion is not codified in the URAA, it is an international obligation
52. Professor Hudec outlines the various types of international agree-
ments. Self executing international obligations become operative upon ratifica-
tion of the agreement. Upon ratification, the obligations are part of domestic
law. A non-self executing obligation requires additional legislation before it be-
comes part of US domestic law. It can become effective domestic law only to the
extent that a domestic law parallels its obligations. Consequently, a self exe-
cuting international agreement, once ratified, is part of federal law, and thus
superior to state law. See Hudec, supra note 10, at 188.
53. Under the Supremacy Clause, all federal laws are superior to state
laws. U.S. CONST. art 6, § 2. Consequently, outside agreements enacted as fed-
eral law are also superior to state law. Cooper, supra note 9, at 144-48. For an
interesting discussion of the vulnerability of state laws under the Supremacy
Clause, see Julie Long, Ratcheting up Federalism: A Supremacy Clause Analy-
sis of NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Agreements, 80 MINN. L. REv. 231 (1995).
54. Long, supra note 53, at 242.
55. The obligation to reconcile subnational government regulations is rec-
ognized in GATT Article XXIV:
Each contracting party shall take such reasonable measures as may be
available to it to ensure observance of the provisions of this Agreement
by the regional and local governments and authorities within its
territory.
GATT, supra note 13, art. XXIV:12.
56. One such panel decision was United States: Measures Affecting Alco-
holic and Malt Beverages. United States: Measures Affecting Alcoholic and
Malt Beverages, June 19, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 206 (1992) (de-
termining that discriminatory state regulations concerning the contents and
packaging of beverages was inconsistent with GATT). See infra notes 75-76.
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of the United States.57 The federal government is responsible
for ensuring that state laws comply with its international obliga-
tions-whether these obligations arise under the GATT or a
WTO Disupute Settlement Body (DSB) decision.58
The consequences of a decision invalidating a state regula-
tion differ greatly from a similar ruling on a federal law. If a
federal law is found invalid, the United States has several op-
tions. First, Congress can correct the offending regulation. Sub-
sequent legislation can simply alter the law to conform with
GATT. 59 Alternatively, Congress may continue the status quo,
and accept retaliatory measures. 60 GATT authorizes a success-
ful claimant to retaliate by withdrawing previous concessions or
suspending obligations if the offending country fails to correct
the violation.61 Finally, Congress could withdraw the United
States from GATT.62 However, withdrawal of the United States
is an extremely drastic alternative that would have extremely
destructive consequences for international trade, and is thus
unlikely.63
State officials do not have nearly as many options. Under
the U.S. Constitution, states are limited in their relations with
foreign nations. The authority to negotiate and enter into agree-
57. See JACKSON, supra note 17, and accompanying text. See also Aceves,
supra note 1, at 463.
58. See supra note 19.
59. This is one of the powers Congress possesses to correct GATT illegal
regulations under its preemptive authority. See supra note 35.
60. Such measures must be appropriate, and not excessive in comparison
to the value of the violation. Article XXIII provides that the Contracting Par-
ties may authorize a party to "suspend the application to any other contracting
party or parties of such concessions or other obligations under this Agreement
as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances." GATT, supra note
13, art. XXIII:2. Determining the proper level of retaliation is itself a difficult
measure. See Norway: Procurement of Toll Collection Equipment for the City of
Trondheim, Apr. 28, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (40th Supp.), at 319 (1993) (compen-
sation for past violations deemed inappropriate and indeterminate).
61. Understanding, supra note 3, art. 22, 1 (Compensation and suspen-
sion of obligations are temporary measures available to an injured party).
62. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. XV, 33
I.L.M. 23 (1994) (Withdrawal). See also Aceves, supra note 1, at 436.
63. Ironically, withdrawal of the United States would destroy many mar-
kets, and in all probability, remove the injurious situation which created the
need for the offending law. Thus withdrawal would not remedy the situation,
but merely reinforce U.S. sovereignty. It is doubtful that withdrawal would ever
result from an adverse panel decision. Furthermore, some scholars argue that
the United States is strongly committed to the WTO dispute settlement process.
Gary Horlick, Dispute Resolution Mechanism: Will the United States Play by the
Rules, J. WORLD TRADE, Feb. 1993, reprinted in 722 COM. LAW & PRAc. COURSE
HANDBOOK (PLI) 685 (1995).
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ments resides solely in the federal government. 64 States cannot
accept trade sanctions by international bodies, nor agree to
trade concessions at the request of a foreign state. 65 If an indi-
vidual state is to voluntarily comply with the international obli-
gations of the United States, the state has but one recourse,
legislative compliance. The state would have to bring the regu-
lation in line with the demands of the international body or for-
eign nation. 66
However, the state also has the option to avoid compliance.
By refusing to act in accordance with the obligations of the na-
tion as a whole (e.g., GATT), the state shifts the onus of compli-
ance onto the federal government.67 As noted earlier, state
regulations can easily be corrected at the federal level; since all
federal legislation is superior to state regulation, an offending
state regulation can be judicially challenged under the
Supremacy Clause. 68 Furthermore, Congress need only pre-
empt the offending state regulation with a complying federal
law.69
C. CONCERNS ABOUT THE WTO
The automatic adoption of panel reports by the DSB places
state regulations in an especially precarious position. The
states can no longer rely on the federal government to prevent
adoption of an adverse decision. Automatic adoption therefore
makes state regulations far more susceptible to attack.70 In
fact, before ratification of the WTO, the European Union issued
64. The Commerce Clause provides that the Congress shall have the power
"[to regulate Commerce with Foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes[.]" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
65. See supra notes 31, 32 & 35.
66. Cooper, supra note 9, at 150.
67. Id. at 154.
68. See supra note 54.
69. See supra note 28. The potential for challenging state laws under the
Supremacy Clause is discussed in the article Ratcheting up Federalism: A
Supremacy Clause Analysis of NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Agreement.
Long, supra note 53 (arguing Supremacy Clause is one basis on which to chal-
lenge GATT illegal or GATT inconsistent state laws).
70. The process by which a regulation can be challenged may follow several
routes. First, the complaining nation might complain to the United States,
which may either negotiate with the state for voluntary compliance, judicially
challenge the law, or preempt the state law. Alternatively, the complainant
may seek a panel decision, which will be adopted automatically. Once the deci-
sion is adopted, the United States may either accept sanctions, or (if the panel
decision allows) change the offending state regulation. If the United States
seeks to change the law, it can either negotiate for voluntary compliance, or
challenge or preempt the law.
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a list of over one hundred state and federal regulations that it
intended to challenge.7 ' This list underscores the drastic
change wrought by the WTO's reversal of the panel report adop-
tion process: before the WTO, a state regulation could have been
found GATT illegal but never adopted because of a lack of con-
sensus. Following the DSB understanding, however, panel find-
ings can be readily adopted and thus challenges are more
likely.7 2
In addition, history indicates that attacks upon state regu-
lation are effective. Although only two complaints have focused
on state laws, in both cases the state regulation was ultimately
invalidated. In 1955, Australia complained of an Hawaiian law
which required retailers of imported eggs to post a sign stating
"We sell foreign eggs."7 3 Ultimately, the regulation was invali-
dated under United States domestic law, which required Hawaii
to conform to the requirements of GATT.7 4 More recently, Can-
ada complained of a host of state regulations discriminating
against foreign producers of alcoholic beverages.7 5 In this case,
the GATT panel issued an adverse decision, finding against the
United States. 76 Under pressure from the United States govern-
71. David Rapp, Will GATT Gut State Laws?, GOVERNING , Sept. 1994, at
88. Such regulations included California's unitary tax law, discrimination
against foreign owned banks and insurance companies, and local safety require-
ments on industrial products which are stricter than federal requirements. Id.
72. Even though automatic adoption of a decision is an innovation, the dis-
pute settlement process has always been somewhat effective. As Professor
Hudec notes: "fJiust over half the rulings... achieved full compliance directly,
two-thirds resulted in full compliance somehow, and nine out often produced a
worthwhile positive result." HUDEC, supra note 20, at 279. However, even if the
former process was effective, the automatic adoption of decisions appears to be
even more effective. Adoption increases the incentive for Members to resolve
their differences before litigation, and, in the event the dispute is litigated, the
result is immediately enforceable.
73. Hawaii v. Ho, 41 Haw. 565, 565 (1957).
74. Id. at 571.
75. In 1992, Canada sought invalidation of over thirty state alcohol regula-
tions. Individual states maintained a variety of measures intended to protect
each state's beer and wine industry. Measures ranged from ingredient restric-
tions to excise tax differentials and wholesale distribution restrictions. A GATT
panel found a vast majority of these state regulations inconsistent with GATT.
Several states maintained restrictions on the ingredients used in various alco-
holic products, which usually took the form of regional procurement require-
ments-beverages could only be made from grains grown in a particular region
of the state. Several states offered lower excise taxes on high volume producers.
Some states required special licenses or maintained state trading monopolies.
United States: Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, supra note
56.
76. The panel recommended that the Contracting Parties request the
United States to bring the regulations in line with its obligations under the
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ment, a number of states have consequently changed their laws
to comply with GATT requirements. 77 Thus, although the pre-
cedent is slight, it suggests that the federal government will up-
hold complaints against state regulations, especially those that
discriminate against foreign products.78
Thus, as implementation of the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments approached, state regulatory sovereignty seemed in dan-
ger of disappearing at the hands of an international agency.7 9
State officials noted that without solid institutional protection,
state laws might not be able withstand a contrary GATT panel
decision.80 It seemed unlikely that the United States would
maintain a GATT illegal state regulation despite its interna-
tional obligations, nor would Congress withdraw from GATT
simply to preserve an offensive state regulation.8 1 Instead, the
federal government would likely force state compliance with the
panel decision, judicially challenge the regulation, or simply pre-
empt state law.8 2 Indeed, it remains to be seen whether Con-
General Agreement. Id. at 297-99. The outcome of the case clearly serves as
warning to the states; it punctuated the near certainty of massive invalidation
of similar state measures under the WTO.
77. Straight, supra note 4, at 242-43.
78. This note does not suggest that states should be allowed to discrimi-
nate against foreign producers. It is significant, however, that discrimination
need not be as apparent or as blatant as it has been in the past. Regulations
that appear evenhanded (and which were intended to be so) can affect foreign
industries in disparate manners. Thus, concern exists not simply to protect dis-
criminatory state laws, but to preserve a state's ability to regulate, despite dis-
parate treatment.
79. Harvard Law Professor Lawrence Tribe expressed concern that propo-
nents of the URAA ignored constitutional safeguards for the sovereign author-
ity of the 50 states as semi-autonomous entities within the federal system. He
further stated that GATT so altered the state of constitutional safeguards that
it must be treatment as a treaty. Professor Tribe considered the standard legis-
lative process (through which an implementing act becomes law) insufficient.
Constitutional Law Expert Tribe Voices Concern Over State Sovereignty, 11
INr'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1166 (July 27, 1994).
80. State attorneys general sought assurances that the language of the
URAA would provide the necessary protection against automatic invalidation of
a state law upon an adverse WTO finding. Rapp, supra note 71, at 88.
81. See infra notes 146-48 & 156 (discussing the federal government's com-
mitment to international trade).
82. Former Maine Attorney General Michael Carpenter noted that "a state
law deemed inconsistent with our nation's GATT obligations ... could easily be
overturned by [the] federal government in U.S. District Court." Amendments to
GATT laws to Protect States: Nations Attorneys General Urged, BANGOR DAILY
NEws, July 28, 1994. Note that coercion cannot be outright. See generally
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (holding that Congress may not
directly require a state to enact a law, but may require certain regulations
before dispensing funds).
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gress would accept trade sanctions or retaliatory measures in
order to allow a state to maintain an offending regulation.
State officials sought protection from this potential regula-
tory ruin.8 3 Among other efforts, the state attorneys general
demanded protective provisions in the implementing legisla-
tion.8 4 Their demands focused on safeguarding their sover-
eignty through changes in the implementing legislation (and not
a wholesale rejection of the WTO).85 As a result of these efforts,
the implementing legislation (the URAA) accorded protection for
state regulations through a variety of provisions.8 6
The attorneys general wanted to assure protection of state
laws under the implementing act.8 7 To this end, they sent a
letter to the Clinton Administration urging resolution of several
concerns, including:
i. Whether the federal government would seriously consider ac-
cepting trade sanctions rather than pressuring states to change
state laws that are successfully challenged in the WTO;
ii. Whether states are guaranteed a formalized process to participate
in the defense of their regulations;
iii. Whether private parties would be able to challenge state regula-
tions, under either GATT or federal law;
83. State officials were not alone in questioning the constitutionality of
GATT. See supra note 79.
84. An attorney general is "the chief law officer of the state. She gives ad-
vice and opinions to the governor and to executive and administrative depart-
ments or agencies." BLAci's LAw DIcTioNARY 129 (6th ed. 1990). As such, she
is responsible for securing the legitimacy of state regulations, and upholding
state law from attack.
85. Forty Two State Attorneys General Question GATT, U.S. NEwswIRE,
July 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES File.
86. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994).
87. This heightened concern of state officials with international trade is-
sues can be traced to several recent developments. First, the scope of the Uru-
guay Round was much greater than any previous series of negotiations. The
inclusion of services and intellectual property in the agreements, as well as the
growth of membership in GATT, resulted in a twenty fold increase in affected
trade over the previous round; nearly $3.7 trillion of trade will be affected. See
JACKSON, supra note 3, at 314 (providing a table of Rounds, number of partici-
pants, and amounts involved). The Tokyo Round, involving 99 countries, af-
fected $155 billion. The first Round, Geneva 1947, involved 23 countries and
affected $10 billion. In comparison, the Uruguay Round involved more than
120 countries, and affected $2.7 trillion in goods, as well as $1 trillion in serv-
ices. The size of the Uruguay Round suggests that with such a large amount of
trade affected, it is inevitable that state regulations will be involved in future
disputes.
Furthermore, recent dispute settlement cases underscore the vulnerability
of state regulations to invalidation at the hands of a GATT dispute resolution
panel. See supra notes 75 & 76.
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iv. Whether the federal government could challenge a state reg-
ulation without an adverse WTO panel decision; and
v. Whether WTO decisions are binding in federal courts. 88
These concerns embody a key principle: regulatory freedom
is necessary for effective state sovereignty. 9 Widespread invali-
dation or preemption of state laws could destroy whatever regu-
latory freedom the states currently exercise. 90 Most of these
concerns focus on determining the possibility and extent to
which state regulations can be invalidated-either by judicial
challenge or legislative preemption. Resolution of these
problems is necessary to assure the future regulatory vitality of
the states.
Of these concerns, most are covered under provisions of the
URAA. 91 Serious questions remain, however, with regard to the
federal government's commitment to safeguarding state inter-
ests. It remains to be clarified whether the United States fed-
eral government will seek to invalidate all GATT inconsistent
state regulations or accept trade sanctions and retaliation.
III. Uruguay Round Agreements Act
Congress adopted the results of the Uruguay Round in the
1994 implementing legislation. 92 Accordingly, the federal gov-
ernment is bound by its international obligation to the terms of
GATT as well as WTO DSB panel decisions.93 The URAA, par-
ticularly section 102, outlines exactly how GATT affects domes-
tic law and the manner in which these international obligations
are enforced. Section 102 codifies the protections that were in-
cluded at the request of the state officials.
The URAA guarantees a formalized process through which
the federal government and states can cooperate to resolve of-
fending regulations, and satisfy the United States' international
88. Forty Two State Attorneys General Question GAT, supra note 85.
89. DYE, supra note 38, at xvi (noting that federal and local governments
need independent responsibility for various aspects of their citizens welfare).
90. See supra notes 79, 80 & 82.
91. See infra section III.
92. Section 101 of the URAA states:
[Tlhe Congress approves.., the trade agreements... resulting from
the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations under the aus-
pices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade... and the state-
ment of administrative action proposed to implement the agreements
that was submitted to the Congress ....
Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 101, 19 U.S.C. § 3511(a) (1994).
93. This remains true until and unless there is subsequent overriding leg-
islation (i.e. withdrawal of GATT or alteration of the commitment to WTO and
GATT as outlined in the URAA). See supra note 4.
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obligations. 94 The Federal-State consultation process is a recog-
nized tool for harmonizing federal and state government; former
trade implementing acts have included similar consultation
mechanisms for developing and implementing overall trade
policy.9 5
Section 102, however, by introducing a consultation process
for dispute settlement, 96 seeks to integrate state governments
into the dispute settlement process and thus improve the safe-
guards provided in earlier implementing acts. 97 Under section
102, in the event a state regulation is challenged in the WTO,
the federal government must consult closely with the state gov-
ernments to achieve an outcome satisfactory to all parties (state
government, federal government, and the WTO): 98
The Trade Representative shall make every effort to ensure that the
State concerned is involved in the development of the position of the
United States at each stage of the consultations and each subsequent
stage of dispute settlement proceedings regarding the matter.
99
This consultation process is triggered automatically when a for-
eign nation requests that the federal government negotiate to
resolve an offending statute.100 The USTR must consult closely
with the states throughout. the dispute settlement process, from
initial contact with the foreign state through the adoption of a
panel decision by the DSB. 1°1 Should the DSB adopt a panel
decision rendering a state law GATT illegal, the USTR will in-
clude the states in the formulation of the U.S. response-either
altering the regulation or accepting retaliation. 10 2
Ideally, the consultation process will achieve a mutually
agreeable outcome. This may involve some compromise by
either the federal or state governments. If the parties, however,
94. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(1)(C) (1994).
95. A development-oriented consultation process is outlined in the Trade
Act of 1974; this process was expanded in 1984 to include the Trade Represen-
tative, reiterated in NAFTA, and revamped in 1994.
96. Section 102 provides:
The Trade Representative shall establish... a Federal-State consulta-
tion process for addressing issues relating to the Uruguay Round
Agreements that directly relate to, or will potentially have a direct ef-
fect on, the States.
Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 102(b)(1)(B), 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(1)(B)
(1994).
97. See Aceves, supra note 1, at 450.
98. Section 102(b) contains several other provisions for consultation. 19
U.S.C. § 3512(b) (1994).
99. Id. § 3512(b)(1)(C)(iii).
100. Id. § 3512(b)(1)(C)(i).
101. Aceves, supra note 1, at 450-53.
102. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(1)(C) (1994).
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cannot reach a solution-if the state proves inflexible-the fed-
eral government may bring a lawsuit seeking to invalidate the
state law as conflicting with existing federal law or international
obligations. 10 3 It is also possible that Congress can exercise its
legislative authority to preempt the offending state regulation,
although this may require greater time and effort. 10 4
The URAA, however, limits the ability of both government
and private individuals to challenge GATT illegal state regula-
tions.105 As plaintiff, the United States must bear the burden of
proving the state regulation is GATT illegal.10 6 The adverse
WTO panel ruling is in itself inconclusive and "shall not be con-
sidered as binding or otherwise accorded deference." 10 7 Conse-
quently, to challenge a state regulation, the United States must
have more persuasive evidence than merely an adverse WTO
panel finding.108
Furthermore, before the United States can bring such an ac-
tion, the USTR must attempt to secure a negotiated settlement
with the state. 10 9 In other words, the federal government can
institute a lawsuit only if the Federal-State consultation process
fails. Indeed, challenging a state law is intended as a "last re-
sort," to be used only when negotiations break down and com-
103. The government could seek to invalidate the law on the grounds that it
violates GATT as implemented under the URAA, or upon some other grounds,
including violation of the Commerce Clause or Dormant Commerce Clause.
104. Cooper, supra note 9. See also supra notes 69 & 70; infra section IV
(discussing the possibility that Congress may preempt state law).
105. The URAA provides that no person other than the United States shall
have any cause of action or defense under any of the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(1)(A) (1994).
106. Id. § 3512(b)(2)(B)(ii) ("[T]he United States shall have the burden of
proving that the law that is the subject of the action, or the application of that
law, is inconsistent with the agreement in question.").
107. Id. § 3512(b)(2)(B)(i). This subsection provides that in any action
brought by the United States under the URAA, "a report of a dispute settlement
panel or the Appellate Body convened under the Dispute Settlement Under-
standing regarding the State law, or the law of any political subdivision thereof,
shall not be considered as binding or otherwise accorded deference." Id.
108. Note that the evidence will most likely be the same in both instances.
The judicial decision cannot simple be the application of the panel decision.
Rather, a judge must consider all information, and render an independent deci-
sion. See section IV(A), infra, for a discussion of whether the United States can
challenge a state law in the absence of a WTO decision.
109. The URAA requires the USTR to verify to the relevant committees in
Congress that it has substantially complied with the consultation process
before the federal government may challenge a state regulation. 19 U.S.C.
§ 3512(b)(2)(C) (1994).
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promise becomes impossible. 110 Thus, these evidentiary and
procedural qualifications may protect state laws from invalida-
tion, even at the hands of the federal government."1
Given the restrictions on the federal government's ability to
challenge regulations, it is no surprise that private individuals
may not challenge state laws on the basis of an adverse WTO
panel ruling.112 Such a provision is not revolutionary in itself;
NAFTA contained a similarly restrictive provision, as did the
1979 Trade Act. 1 3 Both the text of the URAA and its legislative
history indicate that a GATT illegal state regulation cannot be
declared invalid except in an action brought by the United
States. Section 102(c)(A) provides that
No person other than the United States ... shall have any cause of
action or defense under any of the Uruguay Round Agreements or...
may challenge, in any action brought under any provision of law, any
action or inaction by any department, agency, or other instrumentality
of the United States, any State, or any political subdivision of a state
110. The Administrative Action Statement states that the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act does not automatically invalidate a state regulation that is in-
consistent with GATT. Administrative Action Statement, reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4050. It recognizes that the United States, as a WTO mem-
ber, is free to determine how it will comply with its international obligations.
Id. Furthermore, the statement provides evidence that challenges or preemp-
tions are a last resort:
The Administration has traditionally worked very closely with the
states involved in any dispute settlement proceedings, both before and
after any panel consideration, in a cooperative effort to determine the
best course of action. Although ultimately the federal government,
through its Constitutional authority and the implementing bill, retains
the authority to overrule inconsistent state law through legislation or
civil suit, use of this authority has not been necessary in the nearly
half century that the GATT has been in effect.
Id. at 4053.
The Statement also notes that the federal government retains the power to
overrule a state regulation. Id. at 4050. Given the changing conditions of inter-
national trade, and the disparity of the modern dispute settlement process as
compared to the past half century (i.e. automatic adoption), federal corrective
action should not be discounted.
The Administrative Action Statement is codified as part of the URAA. 19
U.S.C. § 3511(a)(2) (1994).
111. Furthermore, it is significant that any successful challenge would only
be prospective. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(2)(B)(iv) (1994). Arguably, as another con-
cession to the states, the effect of a successful lawsuit cannot be retroactive.
Such a qualification is particularly important in revenue legislation; if the rul-
ing were retrospective, a successful challenge might require state governments
to refund considerable amounts of money. By making the effect of a successful
challenge solely prospective, the state will not be severely and debilitatingly
penalized, although it will lose a source of future revenue.
112. Id. § 3512(c)(1).
113. Id. § 3312(c).
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on the ground that such action or inaction is inconsistent with such
agreement.1
1 4
Without standing, a private party cannot challenge a state regu-
lation on the grounds that it is inconsistent with any provision of
the URAA (including the international obligations of GATT). In-
deed, the Administrative Action Statement indicates that pri-
vate parties cannot challenge GATT illegal state regulations
solely on the basis of the URAA or Congress' Commerce Clause
authority.11 5 Private parties cannot simply argue that state
regulations are inconsistent with the URAA. Nor can a party
argue that state law interferes with Congress' exclusive power
over foreign commerce. 116 Such claims would be inconsistent
with the determination, by both Congress and the Administra-
tion, that private lawsuits are an inappropriate means to en-
force compliance with international obligations. 117 In a single
sweeping restriction, the URAA prohibits challenges-by pri-
vate parties-of any state regulation that violates GATT but
does not violate a federal statute other than the URAA.
A survey of section 102 thus reveals that it protects certain
aspects of state regulatory authority (see Figure 1). Nonethe-
less, it leaves key questions unanswered.
114. Id. § 3512(c)(1). See also Administrative Action Statement, supra note
110, at 4055.
115. Administrative Action Statement, supra note 110, at 4055.
116. In essence, Congress seeks to completely preclude any action or defense
based on the Uruguay Round Agreements. Id.
117. Id.
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Relevant Section
Concern of State Officials of the URAA Definitive Answer
Will the federal government Section 101(a)(2) No Resolution
seriously consider accepting [Administrative
trade sanctions, or pressure Action Statement]
states to change laws which are
successfully challenged in the
WTO?
Can the federal government Section 102(b)(2)(B) No Resolution
challenge state regulations
without an adverse WTO panel
decision?
Will the federal government Section 102(b)(1) Yes
guarantee states a formalized
process in which to participate,
in order to defend their
regulations?
Can private parties challenge Section 102(b)(2)(A) No
state laws under either GATT or Section 102(c)
federal law?
Are WTO decisions binding on Section 102(b)(2)(B)(1) No
federal court proceedings?
Figure 1. Correlation between the Concerns of State Officials
and the Resulting Provisions of the URAA
Can the United States challenge a possibly GATT inconsis-
tent state regulation without a WTO panel ruling? Will the
United States accept retaliatory measures or seek domestic in-
validation of the offending regulation? Resolving these ques-
tions may help determine the future of state regulatory freedom.
The remainder of this Note will attempt to resolve these
questions.
IV. Efficacy of Protection Afforded State Regulations under
the URAA
The effectiveness of the protections extended to the states in
the URAA-namely, the consultation process and the restric-
tions on challenges to state regulations-depends in large part
on the commitment of the federal government to protecting state
regulations. If the federal government is committed to main-
taining state regulatory sovereignty, it will be less likely to chal-
lenge state regulations. Codified restrictions, such as the
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procedural and evidentiary requirements of section 102, repre-
sent such a commitment. 18
However, political climates, economic commitments, and
practical considerations must also play a role in determining the
likelihood of a challenge to state regulations." 9 It is therefore
important to determine if and when the federal government may
(or must) challenge state laws, as well as the likelihood of the
federal government doing so when it has discretion.
A. CHALLENGES TO STATE LAws IN THE ABSENCE OF A DSB
RULING
It is unclear whether a federal challenge to a state regula-
tion requires an adverse WTO panel decision. Looking to the
structure of Section 102(b)(2)(C), challenges to state law appear
to be divided into two types-challenges to state law on the ba-
sis of its inconsistency with the Agreement, and challenges to
state law that are the subject of DSB proceedings. 120 Hence,
the language and structure of the URAA suggest that the fed-
eral government may act even in the absence of a WTO
decision.121
Distinguishing between these two situations-the existence
of an adverse WTO panel decision and the absence of a WTO
decision-seems immaterial in light of the fact that a WTO
panel report is not binding evidence in a court (although it may
be used to support the government's argument).1 22 To some
extent, the evidence proffered at a challenge where there is no
118. See supra section III (describing the restrictions on challenges to state
laws).
119. Long, supra note 53, at 233-34 (noting that widespread invalidation of
state laws is neither politically feasible nor is it good policy).
120. Section 102(b)(2)(C) provides generally for USTR accountability for
procedures followed in challenging a state law. Subsection (iii) of that same
section provides additional accountability if the state law was the subject of
DSB proceedings. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(2)(C) (1994).
121. Note that Section 102(b)(2)(C) does not differentiate between state laws
that are the subject of DSB proceedings and those that have not received DSB
scrutiny. Id. § 3512(b)(2)(C).
122. Under the Administrative Action Statement,
[Tihe United States will not seek to introduce into evidence in a federal
court any panel or Appellate Body report issued under the [Under-
standing] with regard to the state measure at issue. The United States
would base any such proceeding on the provisions of the relevant Uru-
guay Round agreement-not a panel report-and the court would thus
consider the matter de novo.
Administrative Action Statement, supra note 110, at 4054. In such a case, the
panel report could only be considered a well reasoned supporting argument.
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panel decision must be similar to the instance where there is an
adverse panel report; the federal government cannot depend
solely on a WTO decision to invalidate a state law. 123 This being
the case, there must be outside grounds for invalidating the reg-
ulation.' 24 Thus, it would be disingenuous to require a WTO
panel report before a decision can be made on alternate grounds.
Consequently, it appears that a challenge to a state law
does not require an adverse WTO decision. This is consistent
with the general conception that GATT, once codified as federal
law, is superior to state law.125 The federal government could
challenge a state regulation simply on the ground that it is in-
consistent with federal law, whether that law is the URAA or
any other federal statute.
Furthermore, neither private parties nor foreign govern-
ments can seek to invalidate the law on the basis of its GATT
illegality, since neither have standing.' 26 Indeed, only the fed-
eral government can pursue such a claim.' 27 If there had been a
DSB ruling, a foreign government could exert pressure on the
United States in the form of trade sanctions. 28 The United
States, however, need not await sanctions before it attempts to
reconcile offending state regulations. Indeed, negotiations
outside the DSB may produce better results than an actual deci-
sion.' 29 The WTO has in fact even stated its preference for ne-
gotiations over actual settlement proceedings.' 30 Given this
preference, it seems likely that the foreign nation would pres-
sure the United States even in the absence of a DSB decision (or
even in the absence of a DSB hearing). This would, in turn,
pressure the states to alter their regulations to comply with de-
mands not yet voiced in the DSB.
In sum, it appears that a DSB ruling is not a necessary pre-
requisite to challenge a potentially GATT illegal state
regulation.
123. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1994).
124. Id.
125. Hudec, supra note 10, at 199.
126. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c) (1994).
127. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
128. GATT permits withdrawal of concessions. GATT, supra note 13, art.
XXIII:2.
129. See supra note 3 (noting that negotiation is preferred over official DSB
proceedings).
130. Understanding, supra note 3, at 115.
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B. CHALLENGES TO STATE LAws FOLLOWING AN ADVERSE DSB
RULING
The Federal-State consultation process outlined in the
URAA provides detailed procedures which the federal govern-
ment must follow in the event of a DSB proceeding against a
state regulation. 131 The Act also provides for continuing consul-
tations, to develop a mutually agreeable solution if an adverse
DSB decision is adopted.' 3 2 If a negotiated settlement is impos-
sible, the United States may challenge the state law in order to
comply with its international obligations. 133
Although the DSB panel decision is a binding international
obligation, the WTO agreements may not require the federal
government to challenge inconsistent state law. An Under-
standing on Article XXIV:2, adopted during the Uruguay Round,
requires each member to seek compliance with GATT at the sub-
national level.' 34 The provision requires only that each mem-
ber nation take "such reasonable measures as may be available
to it to ensure observance . . . by regional and local govern-
ments."135 Essentially, the debate is whether judicial challenge
or legislative preemption is a reasonable measure.' 3 6 Under ac-
cepted interpretation of GATT, the federal government must
correct the law-comply with its international obligation-un-
less doing so would cause a sudden and serious disruption of
government.137
Under GATT, a law will be held invalid only after a judicial
decision. Damages cannot be imposed for violations prior to that
date. This prospective application of judicial challenges lessens
the burden on state government. A state will not be held liable
for revenues collected under a tax regulation that is subse-
quently deemed GATT-illegal. Consequently, a successful chal-
lenge will not deplete the state's treasury by requiring it to turn
over previously collected revenue. 138 This minimizes the poten-
131. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(1) (1994).
132. Id. § 3512(b)(1)(C)(iv).
133. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
134. Understanding, supra note 3, art. 22, 9.
135. GATTr, supra note 13, art. XXIV:12.
136. The drafting history of GATT indicates that forcing corrective meas-
ures at the state level would be reasonable, provided there is not a sudden dis-
ruption of government. Cooper, supra note 9, at 150.
137. Id.
138. The Clinton Administration has stated that GATT will not require any
significant changes in state tax regulations, as these are believed to be consis-
tent with GATT rules regulating tax measures (as well as the GATT require-
ment of national treatment). The GAT, the WTO and the Uruguay Round
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tial for disrupting government programs. The inclusion of the
prospective application provision makes judicial challenge or
preemption more palatable to the states.1 39
C. LIKELIHOOD OF CHALLENGES TO STATE LAWS
The protections of Section 102, intended to limit challenges
to state regulations, may prove ineffective. An active federal
government, which will readily challenge state laws, could be
just as devastating to state regulations as private challenges
would be if they were allowed. Consequently, in order to under-
stand the extent of protection afforded to state regulations, it is
necessary to determine whether the federal government is will-
ing to accept alternatives, such as trade retaliation or sanctions,
instead of challenging or preempting state regulations.
The complex procedure required for a challenge to state reg-
ulations under the URAA may not dissuade the federal govern-
ment from challenging state law. In this regard, the evidentiary
and accountability requirements could be ineffectual in limiting
judicial challenges.' 40 Furthermore, the federal government
has other alternatives; it is not limited solely to judicial chal-
lenge. Congress has the authority to preempt state laws. 41
The practicability of challenging state laws is not solely pro-
cedural, but is also political.' 42 A strong commitment to free in-
ternational trade, balanced against a minor state regulation,
may result in federal intervention.143 Alternatively, a strong
Agreements Act: The Uruguay Round Agreements Act: Statement of Administra-
tive Action, 722 COM. L. & PRAc. COURSE HANDBOOK (PLI) 805, 823 (Sept. 1995).
139. History provides few lessons for the future of state challenges. Until
the 1992 Alcoholic Beverages Case, there had been no panel reports finding a
state regulation inconsistent with GATT. Cooper, supra note 9, at 148. See also
supra notes 75 & 76. The only other case which challenged state regulations,
the Australian complaint against Hawaii's restriction on egg imports, was de-
cided under U.S. domestic law, without a conclusive panel decision. See supra
notes 73 & 74 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 110 & 111 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 35 & 53. Indeed, the Supremacy Clause may prove a
more favorable basis on which to challenge state laws, given the lack of eviden-
tiary and procedural restrictions (which Section 102 requires). See generally
Long, supra note 53. There is scholarship, however, which suggests that Con-
gress will only preempt state regulations if the states fail to adjust their regula-
tory schemes to meet evolving needs. Hugh L. Makens, State Regulation of
International Transactions, 610 CoM. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK (PLI) 513,
515 (July 1988)
142. See supra note 119.
143. President Clinton has noted the dependence of economic growth upon
honoring international obligations and commitments. See 139 CONG. REC.
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commitment to state regulatory freedom, weighed against a
nominal sanction, might discourage intervention and lead to the
acceptance of trade retaliation.
Although the currents of political support fluctuate, general
observations indicate the federal government is committed to
promoting free trade, but not to preserving state sovereignty.' 4 4
The United States has been a Contracting Party of GATT since
1947.145 Indeed, it was under President Truman's initiative
that the earliest conception of an international WTO-like struc-
ture took shape.' 46 Successive Administrations have voiced a
strong commitment to free trade. 47
The benefits of a free trade policy are particularly important
to economic growth and consequently to political support.148
While an economic analysis of the effects of international trade
on the U.S. economy is beyond the scope of this Note, it should
suffice to mention that the amount of goods and services affected
by the Uruguay Round is nearly $4 trillion. 49 A rejection of
international trade, and GATT in particular, would be politically
and economically unacceptable.150
Moreover, accepting sanctions because of a GATT illegal
state regulation is impractical. A WTO Member who receives a
favorable DSB ruling may suspend or withdraw concessions
H904 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1993) (Statement of Rep. Bereuter) (noting that Presi-
dent Clinton had recently discussed this in a speech).
144. An answer to this issue must focus on the Administration (since it is
the Attorney General who would challenge a state law under her Executive
branch authority) as well as Congress (which has the legislative authority to
preempt).
145. See Shell, supra note 8, at 840.
146. Although the International Trade Organization was supported by the
Administration, it failed because of Congressional opposition. Michael P. Mal-
loy, Shifting Paradigms: Institutional Roles in a Changing World, 62 FORDHAM
L. REv. 1911, 1919-20 (1994).
147. In the words of Ronald Reagan: "[Tihe United States remains fully
committed to an active world trade role in the context of an increasingly inter-
related international economy. A reciprocal spirit of world cooperation, permit-
ting fair trade and investment between our country and the rest of the world, is
indispensable to all of us." Proclamation No. 4823, 3 C.F.R. 12 (1982). See also
Jack I. Garvey, Current Development: Trade Law and Quality of Life-Dispute
Resolution Under the NAFTA Side Accords on Labor and the Environment, 89
AM. J. INT'L L. 439, 452 (1995).
148. Many consider presidential support of international trade as a sign of
government interest in industrial and economic growth. Tamim Bayoumi, The
Postwar Economic Achievement, FINANcE & DEVELOPMENT, June 1995, at 48,
49-51.
149. See supra note 87.
150. See supra note 63.
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from the offending nation. 5 1 These concessions may affect an
industry, or a sector of an industry, that has little or no connec-
tion to the offending state. 152 The industry of one state may be
punished for the GATT illegal regulation of another state.'5 3
Arguably, in such a situation the affected industry and the in-
jured state may persuade the federal government to pursue cor-
rective measures.' 5 4 Since retaliation would most likely affect
states or industries other than the offending state, accepting
sanctions in order to preserve a GATT-illegal regulation is not a
viable solution.
The Administration thus appears ready to judicially chal-
lenge GATT illegal state laws in the face of conflicting interna-
tional obligations. It is also necessary, however, to consider
Congress' preemptive authority. Indeed, Congress can preempt
state laws that do not even conflict with an international obliga-
tion.15 5 A Congress committed to free trade could preempt state
laws that survive judicial challenge, or that have never been
considered to be GATT-illegal. 156 Alternatively, Congress can
151. GATT, supra note 13, art. XXIII:2.
152. GATT provides that:
If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider that the circumstances are
serious enough to justify such action, they may authorize a contracting
party or parties to suspend the application to any other contracting
party or parties of such concessions or other obligations .. as they
determine to be appropriate in the circumstances.
GATT, supra note 13, art. XXIII.
153. William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
51, 100-01 (1987) ("[o]nce retaliation occurs ... another domestic constituency
will be consider its interests harmed by the failure to resolve the dispute. If the
other country has carefully targeted its retaliation, that constituency will be a
relatively powerful one, such that there will be considerable pressure placed on
the government to resolve the trade dispute. Since the domestic pressures will
to some degree be offsetting, it will be easier to act contrary to the interest
defending the condemned practice.").
154. The Statement of Administrative Action suggests that the Administra-
tion will weigh the effect of retaliation on possible adverse interests against the
size of the economic sector affected by the required change in law. Richard 0.
Cunningham, Dispute Settlement in the WTO: Did We get what the United
States, or Did we give up the only Remedy that Really Worked, 722 COM. L. &
PRAc. COURSE HANDBOOK (PLI) 547, 566 (Sept. 1995).
155. Congress' preemptive powers exist regardless of whether the state law
affects foreign commerce, provided Congress possesses the authority to regulate
the underlying activity. See Long, supra note 53, at 253-60 (outlining the pre-
requisites to a legal challenge based on preemption).
156. Members of Congress have voiced their support for open trade: "The
United States must continue to affirm its commitment to a free and open trad-
ing system, reflecting the notions of trade embodied in the General Agreements
on Tariffs and Trade and our other international agreements." 131 CONG. REC.
S10,120 (daily ed. July 25, 1985) (statement of Sen. Moynihan). "To maintain a
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also protect regulations which do conflict with an international
obligation. A Congress that is opposed to free trade, and com-
mitted to the protection of domestic industries and state sover-
eignty, could preserve state regulations by overriding executive
opposition. Under Section 102(b)(2)(C), the USTR must consult
with Senate and House committees before instituting a chal-
lenge. 157  If Congress wishes to protect the state regulation, the
committees could propose a compromise favorable to the states
or, in the extreme, introduce legislation removing federal juris-
diction over the controversy.-5 8 It is essential to note, however,
that Congress is taking an increasing interest in international
trade policy, a development which may preclude such
protections.159
Furthermore, even if Congress were inclined towards pro-
tectionism, that tendency would not necessarily ensure state
sovereignty. A large body of academic work suggests that Con-
gress is generally not committed to protecting state regulatory
power. 160 This is especially true when the states regulate activi-
ties that are clearly regulable by the federal government. 161 In-
deed, there is evidence that the federal government tends to
accumulate power, reducing the scope of state regulations. 62
fair and open trading system we must actively enforce trade agreements and
laws and modify them where necessary." 131 CONG. REC. S15,986 (daily ed.
Nov. 20, 1985) (statement of Sen. Mattingly).
157. Note that under Section 102(b)(2)(C), the USTR need not obtain con-
gressional approval before the government proceeds with the challenge. 19
U.S.C. § 3512(b)(2)(C) (1994).
158. Section 102(c) is essentially such a restriction of jurisdiction, since it
prohibits private parties from bringing an action. Id. § 3512(c).
159. Jeffrey E. Garten, American Trade Law in a Changing World Economy,
29 INT'L LAw. 15, 19 (1995).
160. Indeed, there is evidence that the federal government tends to accumu-
late power, reducing a state's freedom to regulate. See Pete Du Pont, Federal-
ism in the Twenty First Century: Will States Exist?, 16 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y
137 (1993) (proposing that the scope of local government has been continually
narrowed over the years). In essence, Du Pont argues that since United States
v. Darby, Congress has been able to infringe upon traditional state regulation.
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding Congressional regula-
tion of wages and hours of intrastate workers). In recent years, Congress has
regulated state and municipal employees and garbage, while the federal judici-
ary has overseen schools (desegregation) and family matters (divorce and ali-
mony). Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528,
554 (1985) (upholding application of federal labor laws to municipal employees);
Philadephia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628-629 (1978) (requiring New Jersey
to accept hazardous waste from nearby states); Du Pont, supra, at 141.
161. See supra notes 41,42,47 & 53. See also NowAK, supra note 41, at 311.
162. See generally Du Pont, supra note 160.
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In sum, the federal government lacks a strong commitment
to state regulatory freedom, particularly when those regulations
negatively affect international trade. Given the federal govern-
ment's willingness to explicitly correct GATT illegal state regu-
lations, the use of informal pressure on the states to correct
their own regulations is even more probable. 163 An informal
method would avoid damaging political choices, and would hope-
fully correct the offending regulation. In order for informal pres-
sure to succeed, however, judicial challenge or legislative
preemption must be a viable option.164 A federal government
unwilling to pursue formal channels to invalidate a state regula-
tion will be unable to exert the pressure necessary to change the
law through an informal process. As demonstrated above, the
federal government may be willing to use formal measures.
Consequently, it would be at least as likely to pursue informal
measures. Where these fail, the federal government may easily
resort to formal challenges or preemption of a GATT illegal state
regulations.
Conclusion
The URAA provides some protection for state regulations
subject to adverse DSB panel decisions. It prohibits private
challenges to state regulations on the basis of GATT illegality,
and places evidentiary, procedural, and accountability require-
ments on challenges by the federal government. However, in
the absence of a clear commitment to those state regulations
that affect international trade, such protections are simply
ephemeral. The federal government is not sympathetic to
GATT-illegal regulations, and has the authority to challenge or
preempt these laws. Given the political climate in which such
decisions are made, GATT-illegal state regulations have little
hope of actual protection.
163. See supra notes 110 & 153-54.
164. The Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Dole noted that the direct coer-
cion of states by the federal government is unconstitional. South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208-11 (1987). However, the federal government may condi-
tion funding on the fulfillment of certain actions, one of which may be regula-
tory conformity. Id. at 209-10. Note that this does not affect the application of
informal pressure on state governments by the executive or his agents.
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